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INDIGENTS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: THE
IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUTE-
EQUALITY AND FRIVOLITY
STEPHEN M, FELDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
rHROUGHOUT history, poverty has often been equated with inmo-
I rality. Nonetheless, the idea that the poor should have access to the
courts can be traced as far back as the Magna Carta in England. Early
in this country's history, states began to enact statutes to allow the poor
access to the courts.' Congress, however, did not pass a statute until
1892 to enable indigents to institute actions in the federal courts.' The
House Report struck the keynote for that first federal in forma pauperis
statute: "Will the Government allow its courts to be practically closed to
its own citizens, who are conceded to have valid and just rights, because
they happen to be without the money to advance pay to the tribunals of
* Teaching Fellow, Stanford University Law School; B.A. 1977, Hamilton College;
J.D. 1982, University of Oregon. My thanks to Jack Friedenthal for his comments on an
earlier draft.
1. See Catz & Guyer, Federal In Forma Pauperis Litigation: In Search of Judicial
Standards, 31 Rutgers L. Rev. 655, 657 (1978). This belief is sometimes still expressed
today. See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-49, at 1120-21 (1978).
2. Magna Carta § 40, at 327 (J.C. Holt trans. 1965). For historical discussions of in
forma pauperis legislation, see Catz & Guyer, supra note 1, at 656-57; Duniway, The Poor
Man in the Federal Courts, 18 Stan. L. Rev. 1270, 1271-73 (1966); Maguire, Poverty and
Civil Litigation, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 363-81, 391-98 (1923).
3. For a detailed discussion of these state in forma pauperis statutes, see Maguire,
supra note 2, at 381-90.
4. Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 (1982)). The relevant parts of the statute now read:
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, pros-
ecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a person
who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security therefor.
Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant's
belief that he is entitled to redress.
(d) The court... may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue,
or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.
Id. § 1915(a), (d). Today's in forma pauperis statute remains essentially unchanged from
the 1892 statute. For a detailed discussion of the amendments that have been made in the
in forma pauperis statute since 1892, see Catz & Guyer, supra note 1, at 657-59;
Duniway, supra note 2, at 1271-77. This Article does not discuss when a complaint is
"malicious" under § 1915(d) because district courts rarely rely on this ground to dismiss
a complaint. In Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1306-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per
curiam), the D.C. Circuit discussed the § 1915(d) maliciousness standard. The court ob-
served that complaints that threaten violence, make "disrespectful references to the
court" or are "plainly abusive of the judicial process" could be classified as malicious. Id.
at 1309.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
justice?"'
The main provision of the modem federal in forma pauperis statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a), enables indigents to file civil actions in the federal
courts without paying a filing fee.6 Thus, the federal courts are at least
theoretically open to even the most impoverished litigants. The in forma
pauperis statute, however, is conditional: under section 1915(d), a court
may dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint "if satisfied that the action is
frivolous." 7 This nebulous condition has spurred considerable disagree-
ment: can an in forma pauperis complaint be dismissed even though an
identical paid complaint cannot be similarly dismissed?'
This disagreement has gained new significance as the contemporary
use of the in forma pauperis statute has evolved. Many in forma pauperis
plaintiffs are state prisoners proceeding pro se against prison officials and
guards.9 In 1983, for example, state prisoners filed over 17,000 civil
rights complaints."0 Most of these prisoner complaints are unquestion-
5. H.R. Rep. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1892).
6. A person ordinarily must pay a filing fee of sixty dollars before filing a civil ac-
tion. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (1982). See infira note 75 and accompanying text.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982).
8. See, eg., Catz & Guyer, supra note 1, at 672-79 (describing conflict between view
that only extreme circumstances may justify denying leave to file and view that § 1915(d)
is designed to protect the courts from abuse by indigents); Duniway, supra note 2, at 1279
(the fact that litigants have the privilege but not the right to proceed in forma pauperis
has allowed courts to "deny relief more easily in cases not clearly within the statute");
Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal
Courts, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 618-21 (1979) (discussing problems with complaint screen-
ing process in which judge involvement is limited).
9. In 1983, 255,546 civil cases were commenced in the federal district courts. Of
those, 18,350 were civil rights petitions filed by state and federal prisoners. See Adminis-
trative Office of the United States, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics A-10 to -11
(1983). Also during 1983, 17,660 prisoner civil rights actions were terminated. Of those,
15,951 cases ended before any pretrial proceeding had begun. See id. at A-24. In 1970,
state prisoners filed 2657 civil rights petitions; by 1982, the number had ballooned to
16,741. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the
Director 102-04 (1982). Most prisoners proceed pro se and in forma pauperis. See Tur-
ner, supra note 8, at 617; Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of
Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 159, 159-60, 187 & n. 112 (1972).
10. Administrative Office of the United States, supra note 9, at A-11. Prisoners file an
enormous number of civil rights complaints because it costs them nothing. See Franklin
v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42
(2d Cir. 1982) (plurality opinion); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 951 n.6 (4th Cir.
1979); Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'dper curiam, 480 F.2d 805
(5th Cir. 1973); Turner, supra note 8, at 646-47; Note, Petitions to Sue In Forma Pauperis
in Federal Courts: Standards and Procedures for the Exercise of Judicial Discretion, 56
B.U.L. Rev. 745, 751 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Petitions to Sue]. Other reasons exist for
the large number of prisoner petitions:
The relationship of state prisoners and the state officers who supervise their
confinement is far more intimate than that of a State and a private citizen. For
state prisoners, eating, sleeping, dressing, washing, working, and playing are all
done under the watchful eye of the State, and so the possibilities for litigation
under the Fourteenth Amendment are boundless. What for a private citizen
would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with his tailor, with his
neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute with the State.
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ably meritless. 1
This Article explores the restrictions and controls that district courts
can legitimately place on unpaid actions. 2 The ambiguous language and
the unhelpful legislative history of the statute have created four problems
for the courts. First, how should the courts define "frivolous" in section
1915(d)? Second, should the courts allow any financially eligible person
to proceed in forma pauperis under section 1915(a), or should the courts
also examine the merits of an action under section 1915(d) before grant-
ing in forma pauperis status? Third, should the courts require issuance
and service of process whenever an in forma pauperis complaint is filed?
Fourth, when should the courts allow an in forma pauperis plaintiff to
amend a frivolous complaint? This Article discusses each of these four
problems. The last part of the Article explores the constitutional ramifi-
cations of treating in forma pauperis plaintiffs differently from paying
plaintiffs.
I. THE DEFINITION OF "FRIVOLOUS"
Section 1915(d) allows a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis
action if it is "frivolous." Neither section 1915 nor its legislative history,
however, suggests a definition for "frivolous."' 3 While the federal circuit
courts of appeals have not agreed on one definition, 4 they have referred
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973); see Turner, supra note 8, at 625-37.
11. See Duniway, supra note 2, at 1277 n.61; Federal Judicial Center Prisoner Civil
Rights Committee, Recommended Procedures for Handling Prisoner Civil Rights Cases
in the Federal Courts 9 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Federal Judicial Center]. See supra
note 9.
12. Although not deciding whether the practice is acceptable, the Supreme Court has
noted that under the statute courts have pronounced a claim frivolous and then dismissed
it before allowing the plaintiff to file in forma pauperis. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 826 & n.15 (1977).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. (1892).
See generally Petitions to Sue, supra note 10, at 747-53 (discussing possible definitions of
frivolous).
14. Compare Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 951-52 (4th Cir. 1979) (action is frivo-
lous if it is "'beyond doubt' and under any 'arguable' construction, 'both in law and in
fact' of the substance of the plaintiff's claim that he would not be entitled to relief")
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)) with Malone v. Colyer, 710 F.2d
258, 261 (6th Cir. 1983) (action is frivolous "if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief"). One circuit has approved
two definitions that appear to be inconsistent. Compare Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886,
892 (5th Cir. 1976) (complaint is frivolous if it has no arguable substance either in law or
fact) with Jones v. Bales, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (citing Jones v. Bales,
58 F.R.D. 453, 464 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (frivolous actions are those "in which the plaintiff's
realistic chances of ultimate success are slight")). The Ninth Circuit expressly refused to
define "frivolous" until October 1984. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-29
(9th Cir. 1984); Gifford v. Tiernan, 670 F.2d 882, 885 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 804 (1982). In Murphy, the court adopted the Fifth Circuit's approach in Watson.
745 F.2d at 1227-28. Some circuit courts will find particular complaints frivolous, but
will not announce a general definition of frivolousness. See, e.g., Green v. White, 616
F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Van Meter v. Morgan, 518 F.2d 366, 367
(8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975).
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to the tests for federal question jurisdiction 15 and for statement of a claim
for relief 6 when defining frivolousness in section 1915(d). Thus, this
part of the Article begins with a discussion of the tests for federal ques-
tion jurisdiction and statement of a claim.17 This discussion is then used
as a foundation for exploring the parameters of a sound definition of
frivolousness.
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction and Statement of a Claim
The test for determining whether allegations are sufficient to confer
federal question jurisdiction has two prongs. First, pursuant to statute,
the plaintiff must present a federal question-a claim "arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."1" Second, courts
have added the requirement that the fedral question must be "substan-
tial."' 9 Jurisdiction is lacking, however, only if the insubstantiality of the
federal claim is "very plain,"'20 or, as it is more commonly stated, if the
claim is wholly insubstantial.21 Thus, both prongs of the test for federal
question jurisdiction are legal inquiries; 22 the factual allegations of the
complaint are accepted as true.23
15. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1984); Reece v.
Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 140 (9th Cir. 1962) (per curiam).
16. See, e.g., Malone v. Colyer, 710 F.2d 258, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1983); Montana v.
Commissioners' Court, 659 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1026
(1982); Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Boyce v.
Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 951-52 (4th Cir. 1979).
17. The tests for federal question jurisdiction and statement of a claim are also often
compared with each other. See, eg., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.186, 199-200 (1962); Kenis-
ton v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1297-1300 (9th Cir. 1983); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d
1337, 1340-43 (9th Cir. 1981); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1350, at 543 (1969).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). This statutory requirement is grounded in the Constitu-
tion. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
19. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678,
682-83 (1946); 13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3564, at 66-77 (1984).
20. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199 (1962) (quoting Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Ex-
change, 262 U.S. 271, 274 (1923)).
21. See Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981). Frequently, the
courts state that jurisdiction is lacking if the claims are "wholly insubstantial and frivo-
lous." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946). The text of this Article does not
mention this phrasing of the standard because it could confuse the judicially created con-
cept of frivolousness for federal question jurisdiction with the statutory concept of frivo-
lousness in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
If a defendant is absolutely immune from liability, then the claim is wholly insubstan-
tial. See Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1345. Likewise, if "prior decisions inescapably render the
claims frivolous," then they are wholly insubstantial. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
528, 537-38 (1974); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 683-85 (1946). And similarly, if the
plaintiff's action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a private party so that there is
no state action, then the claim is wholly insubstantial. See, e.g., Franklin, 662 F.2d at
1345; Howard v. Lemmons, 547 F.2d 290, 290 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
22. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1962); 13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E.
Cooper, supra note 19, § 3564, at 66-68.
23. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v.
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To test whether the plaintiff has stated a claim for which relief can be
granted, a court must ask if the plaintiff can prove any set of facts in
support of the claim that would entitle him or her to relief.24 Thus, this
test also inquires into the legal sufficiency of the complaint; the factual
allegations are again accepted as true.25
The relationship between the tests for federal question jurisdiction and
statement of a claim can thus be identified. Although both tests assume
the factual allegations to be true and inquire into the legal sufficiency of
the complaint, their degree of inquiry differs. The test for federal ques-
tion jurisdiction is a threshold legal inquiry, while the test for statement
of a claim is a searching examination.
For example, if a plaintiff were to allege a novel cause of action based
on the Constitution, a federal question would exist, and because the issue
would be novel, the question would not be wholly insubstantial. There-
fore, the allegations would be sufficient to confer federal question juris-
diction.2 6 Nevertheless, a court might decide that this novel cause of
action should not be allowed. If so, the court would then hold that the
plaintiff had failed to state a claim for relief.
Nonetheless, determining whether a particular claim fails the thresh-
old test for jurisdiction or, instead, fails the more searching test for state-
ment of a claim is sometimes difficult. The distinction is one of degree,
not of bright lines.2 7 The difficulty arises from the substantiality doc-
Ernst Enters., Inc., 711 F.2d 138, 139-40 (9th Cir. 1983); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d
1337, 1347 (9th Cir. 1981).
Sometimes, the court must inquire into jurisdictional facts; this inquiry, however, is not
directed towards the substance of the actual claim, though the jurisdictional facts and the
merits may be intertwined. See Berardinelli v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 587 F.2d 37, 38-39
(9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra, note 17, § 1350, at 559.
Because federal question jurisdiction can now be invoked without a minimum amount at
issue, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982), jurisdictional facts will most often relate to questions
of timeliness and exhaustion of administrative remedies. See, e.g., Avila v. Immigration
and Naturalization Serv., 731 F.2d 616, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1984) (Federal Tort Claims Act
claims will be dismissed if a proper adminsitrative claim is not filed); Cooper v. Bell, 628
F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1980) (timely filing of district court complaint in employment
discrimination case is jurisdictional prerequisite but subject to equitable extension in ap-
propriate cases).
24. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46 (1957); Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1983); Franklin v. Ore-
gon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1343 (9th Cir. 1981); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir.
1976); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This test is more often stated in the negative: the court
asks if the plaintiff has failed to state a claim. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46; Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6).
25. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S.
411,421-22 (1969); Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1983); Watson v.
Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1976). See supra note 23.
26. See 13B C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, supra note 19, § 3564, at 68-72; see,
e.g., Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 684-85 (1946) (jurisdiction upheld where right of
petitioner to recover depended on the construction given the Constitution and applicable
federal statute by the district court).
27. See Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1983); Franklin v. Ore-
gon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1981) (Sneed, J., concurring).
1985]
418 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54
trine-the second prong of the test for federal question jurisdiction. Un-
like the first prong-whether there is a federal claim-the substantiality
doctrine, though still a threshold test, strays into the bounds of the more
searching test for statement of a claim.2"
The relationship between the tests for federal question jurisdiction and
statement of a claim has additional consequences. If a court lacks juris-
diction, it lacks the power to reach the question of whether the plaintiff
has stated a claim. The court must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction: a
dismissal not on the merits and not res judicata to future claims; simi-
larly, if a court properly reaches the issue of whether the plaintiff has
stated a claim, then it must have jurisdiction, and its ultimate decision
can be on the merits.29
28. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 61 (9th Cir. 1967) (Hamley, J., dissenting).
Whether the substantiality of a claim should be a jurisdictional issue has been ques-
tioned. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Spe-
cialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913). The Supreme Court has stated that "the view that an
insubstantial federal question does not confer jurisdiction (is] a maxim more ancient than
analytically sound." Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 404 (1970). But see Franklin v.
Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981) (reasoning that statutory history sup-
ports the substantiality doctrine). Nonetheless, the substantiality doctrine remains the
rule. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-38 (1974). One reason advanced in support of
the doctrine is that it limits pendent jurisdiction claims; insubstantial federal claims can-
not be used to gain jurisdiction over pendent state claims. See 13B C. Wright, A. Miller
& E. Cooper, supra note 19, § 3564, at 75; Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the Dis-
trict Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 168 (1953). This rationale, however, has been under-
mined by the recent Supreme Court case of Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), which significantly limits pendent jurisdiction. Id. at
117-201. There, the Court held that the eleventh amendment's bar to suits against a state
applied to pendent state claims. Id. at 120. In addition, it has been suggested that United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966), stands for the proposition that a pen-
dent state claim must be dismissed "if the federal claim, though substantial enough to
confer jurisdiction, were dismissed before trial." C. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts
106 (4th ed. 1983).
29. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1962); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682
(1946); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1343 (9th Cir. 1981); Black v. Payne, 591
F.2d 83, 86 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979); 5 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 17, § 1357, at 611-12.
Courts can conceivably use the test for statement of a claim as an expedient to deter-
mine ifjurisdiction exists. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). This judicial
substitution of one test for another suggests that an examination of the logical relation-
ship between the tests would be profitable. Four logical relations between the tests for
federal question jurisdiction and statement of a claim can be identified. First, if a com-
plaint would pass the test for statement of a claim, then it must also pass the test for
jurisdiction. See Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974) (reversed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction because
the complaint passed the test for statement of a claim). Second, if a complaint would fail
the test for statement of a claim, then it may or may not logically pass the test for juris-
diction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). Third, if a complaint would pass the
test for jurisdiction, then it may or may not pass the test for statement of a claim. See
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 199-200 (1962); Bell, 327 U.S. at 682; Franklin, 662 F.2d at
1341; id. at 1349 (Sneed, J., concurring). Finally, if a complaint would fail the test for
jurisdiction, then it must logically fail the test for statement of a claim. This logical
relationship is the logical transposition of the first relationship. See I. Copi, Introduction
to Logic 319 (5th ed. 1978).
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The interrelationships between the tests for federal question jurisdic-
tion and statement of a claim suggest that each test may be likened to a
fishing net. The mesh of the net for jurisdiction is larger than the mesh
of the net for statement of a claim. When a complaint is filed, it must
first swim through the net for jurisdiction; if the complaint gets caught in
the net, then it stops-jurisdiction is lacking and the action ends. Even if
it swims through the net for jurisdiction, however, it might still get
caught in the tighter mesh for statement of a claim. If the complaint gets
caught in this latter net, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim, and the
action ends. If the complaint passes through both nets, the action
continues.
B. Frivolousness
How does frivolousness in section 1915(d) relate to federal question
jurisdiction and statement of a claim? Returning to the metaphor of the
fishing nets, the question is how large is the mesh of the net for frivolous-
ness. The answer will largely determine how much control district
courts can exercise over the processing of in forma pauperis claims.
Thus, the advantages of granting extensive control to the district courts
must be balanced against the dangers of dismissing meritorious claims
prematurely.
Several policy factors bear on this issue. Four factors weigh in favor of
a narrow definition of frivolous, which would permit more complaints to
escape dismissal under section 1915(d). First, the clear purpose of sec-
tion 1915(a) should not be obscured. It is intended to allow indigents to
use the courts.3" Second, common sense and reality dictate that the
courts must be sensitive to the great potential for abuses in the prisons.'
This factor merits great weight because so many in forma pauperis plain-
tiffs are prisoners.3 2 Third, most in forma pauperis plaintiffs lack experi-
ence and skill in legal pleading; thus they often submit awkward and
confusing complaints.33 Finally, related to the previous factors, some
claims are meritorious; if frivolous is defined too broadly, then these mer-
itorious claims might be prematurely dismissed.34
Nonetheless, six policy factors favor a broad definition.3" First, an
30. See Adkins v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948); Crisafi
v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); McTeague v. Sosnowski,
617 F.2d 1016, 1019 (3d Cir. 1980).
31. See Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1976).
32. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 9-10, infra note 123 and accompanying text.
34. See Taylor v. Gibson, 529 F.2d 709, 713 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 832 (1977) (policy cannot justify the failure to recognize valid con-
stitutional claims). As stated by the Fifth Circuit: "The difficult task facing the courts is
to winnow out the wheat from the unusual amount of chaff necessarily presented in a
system which fosters pro se litigation." Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 890 (5th Cir.
1976).
35. Some of these policy factors are only applicable to in forma pauperis plaintiffs
1985] 419
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enormous number of in forma pauperis complaints are filed, and the vast
majority of these are meritless.36 Second, unlike paying plaintiffs, in
forma pauperis plaintiffs have no economic disincentives to filing merit-
less claims.37 Third, in forma pauperis claims are a drain on public funds
and judicial resources.3" Fourth, in forma pauperis plaintiffs who are
also prisoners arguably have an incentive to file meritless claims: they
might get a trip to the courthouse.39 Fifth, allowing the meritless claims
of prisoners to progress through the judicial system is likely to under-
mine the authority of prison officials and interfere with prison disci-
pline.' Finally, as a matter of comity, the federal courts should avoid
conflicts with state authorities by minimizing the instances where they
tell state authorities how to manage state prisons.'"
In light of these policy factors, a plurality of the circuit courts have
defined frivolous broadly.42 The Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have
stated that a frivolous claim is one without arguable substance in law or
fact.43 The Fifth Circuit has also approved the often mentioned standard
that a complaint is frivolous if the plaintiff's realistic chances of ultimate
success are slight.' The District of Columbia Circuit has held that a
who are prisoners. This supports the notion of two in forma pauperis statutes with one
geared exclusively towards prisoners. See infra Conclusion.
36. See Duniway, supra note 2, at 1277 n.61. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying
text.
37. See Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1983); Jones v. Bales, 58
F.R.D. 453, 463 (N.D. Ga. 1972), affd per curiam, 480 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1973).
38. See Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1983); Collins v. Cundy, 603
F.2d 825, 828 (10th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 601 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963); Duniway, supra note 2, at 1281. It has been
argued that the public does not bear a substantial cost in in forma pauperis actions be-
cause the statute only covers "the most minor costs of litigation." See Ziegler & Her-
mann, supra note 9, at 189. However, this argument fails to account for the judicial
resources expended on in forma pauperis cases as well as the costs that government de-
fendants must bear when complaints are not dismissed sua sponte as frivolous.
39. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ander-
son v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 42 (2d Cir. 1983). A prisoner, however, is not entitled, as a
matter of right, to appear at a hearing in a civil rights action. Armstrong v. Rushing, 352
F.2d 836, 837 (9th Cir. 1965).
40. Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963);
id. at 604 (Duniway, J., concurring).
41. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973). See supra notes 35-41 and
accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text. Some courts have stated that a
district court's discretion is especially broad if the plaintiff is a prisoner. See, e.g., Torres
v. Garcia, 444 F.2d 537, 537 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Shobe v. California, 362 F.2d
545, 546 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 887 (1966).
43. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984); Woodall v. Foti,
648 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1981); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 951-52 (4th Cir.
1979); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891-92 (5th Cir. 1976).
44. Jones v. Bales, 58 F.R.D. 453, 463-64 (N.D. Ga. 1972), affldper curiam, 480 F.2d
805 (5th Cir. 1973). Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged this standard, the court
did not adopt it. See Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 & n.2 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 896 (1965); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 604 (9th Cir.) (Duniway, J., con-
curring), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963). The Fourth Circuit has questioned whether
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complaint is frivolous if there is no factual or legal basis for remedy of
the asserted wrong,45 and the Tenth Circuit has held that a complaint is
frivolous if it cannot be supported by a rational argument on the law and
facts." Of the circuits that have defined frivolous, only the Sixth Circuit
has chosen a narrow definition, equating frivolous with a failure to state a
claim. Thus, a complaint can be dismissed for frivolousness only if the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims.4 7
These definitions reveal that the courts have identified two components
of frivolousness. All of the circuits require an examination of the legal
sufficiency of an in forma pauperis complaint. Except for the Sixth Cir-
cuit, they all also require some inquiry into the factual basis of a
complaint.
The best definition would thus emphasize a dual inquiry-into the law
and into the facts-and would also incorporate a reasonableness factor.
Thus, a complaint should be held to be frivolous only if it lacks reason-
able basis in law or fact. This recommended standard is essentially the
same as "without arguable substance in law or fact" and "without ra-
tional argument on the law or facts,""4s and is superior to a finding of
frivolousness based on a plaintiff's "realistic chances of ultimate suc-
cess."'49 Unlike this latter standard, the recommended standard isolates
and therefore emphasizes the two components of law and fact, as well as
a reasonableness standard. Moreover, almost all in forma pauperis plain-
tiffs are pro se, and a pro se litigant's realistic chances of ultimate success
are always slight."0
The legal inquiry of frivolousness should be the same as the test for
failure to state a claim-a complaint is legally frivolous only if the plain-
tiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims.51 This legal inquiry
is therefore more searching than the inquiry into federal question juris-
the "ultimate success" standard is consistent with the Supreme Court's statements in
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), and Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976), that pro se complaints should be held to a more lenient standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 951, 952 r8 (4th
Cir. 1979).
45. See Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
46. See Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court Clerk, 664 F.2d 812, 815 (10th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 840 (1982); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 828 (10th
Cir. 1979).
47. See Malone v. Colyer, 710 F.2d 258, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1983). A case from the
Eighth Circuit suggests that circuit may also adopt a narrow definition yet recognizes
that pro se complaints should be considered under less stringent standards. See Wilson v.
Iowa, 636 F.2d 1166, 1167-68 (8th Cir. 1981).
48. See supra notes 43, 46 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Cf. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d
1221, 1227 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting district court's definition of nonfrivolous as reason-
able probability of success on the merits as too broad).
51. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984); Crisafi v. Holland,
655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 951 (4th Cir.
1979); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891-92 (5th Cir. 1976).
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diction. Thus, any complaint that would fail either the test for statement
of a claim or the test for jurisdiction would logically also be legally
frivolous.52
The factual inquiry of frivolousness should ask whether the plaintiff
has presented reasonable facts in support of the claims. A similar ap-
proach has been used in the First Circuit in the context of civil rights
violations. 53 This factual inquiry should be a threshold inquiry and not a
fact-finding process for the resolution of disputed facts.54 Nonetheless,
the district courts could dismiss many claims pursuant to this factual
component. For example, courts could dismiss claims based on "wholly
fanciful" factual allegations.5 5 Likewise, if the factual allegations were
vague and conclusory,5 6 or if the plaintiff were unable to clarify and par-
ticularize his complaint after a request by the court,57 then the claim
could be dismissed as factually frivolous.58 This factual inquiry distin-
guishes the test for frivolousness from the tests for federal question juris-
diction and statement of a claim. Thus, a complaint that confers
juridsiction and states a claim might nonetheless fail the test for
52. Thus, cases stating that frivolous claims are often wholly insubstantial are under-
standable. See, eg., Wright v. Rhay, 310 F.2d 687, 687-88 (9th Cir. 1962) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 373 U.S. 918 (1963); Reece v. Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 140 (9th Cir. 1962)
(per curiam). Likewise, those cases that equate failure to state a claim with frivolousness
are also understandable. See United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F.2d
573, 574-75 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 951 (4th Cir.
1979); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891-92 (5th Cir. 1976). As a practical matter,
however, if a complaint is wholly insubstantial and thus insufficient to confer jurisdiction,
then the court lacks the power to dismiss the complaint on the merits as frivolous under
§ 1915(d). See infra note 91.
53. See Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1078 (1st Cir. 1980); Fisher v. Flynn, 598
F.2d 663, 665 (Ist Cir. 1979). But see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (pro se
complaints should be tested by "less stringent standards than formal pleadings by
lawyers").
54. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 1228; see Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1983) (dismissal is
appropriate where the complaint's allegations were "beyond credulity") (quoting Boruski
v. Stewart, 381 F. Supp. 529, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)). In one case, the Ninth Circuit noted
that the plaintiff's factual allegations "stretch one's credulity." Allison v. California
Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969). Although the court reversed the district
court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, it remanded the case for further proceedings to explore
the plaintiff's allegations because of its skepticism that the plaintiff had, in fact, been
physically abused by the correctional authorities. See id. at 823-24.
56. See Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
57. See Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1969); see,
eg., Harris v. United States Dep't of Justice, 680 F.2d 1109, 1110-11 (5th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), which requires a short and plain statement of
the claim), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1209 (1983); cf Gillibeau v. City of Richmond, 417
F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1969) (failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) can also be
basis for finding complaint to be legally insufficient because of a failure to state a claim).
A district court can consult its own records to determine if a complaint is frivolous. See
Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984); Van Meter v. Morgan, 518
F.2d 366, 368 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975).
58. The "ultimate success" standard appears to be based on an overly expansive read-
ing of this factual prong of frivolousness. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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frivolousness.59
Returning to the metaphor of a fishing net,60 if the mesh of the net for
statement of a claim is smaller than the mesh for federal question juris-
diction, then the mesh of the net for frivolousness is smaller than the
mesh of both federal question jurisdiction and statement of a claim.
Thus, for an in forma pauperis plaintiff, a complaint must first swim
through the net for jurisdiction, then through the net for statement of a
claim, and then still through the net for frivolousness. This final net-
testing for frivolousness-is a significant additional screening process ap-
plicable only to in forma pauperis complaints. It gives the district courts
the needed discretion to prevent abuse of the in forma pauperis process,
yet it allows possibly meritorious claims to continue.61
I. ONE STEP OR Two STEP
Some federal courts of appeals have stated that section 1915 requires a
federal district court to perform two distinct steps whenever a person
applies to proceed in forma pauperis 2 In the first step, taken pursuant
to section 1915(a), the district court determines whether the applicant is
financially eligible to proceed without paying. If the person is financially
eligible, the district court must grant in forma pauperis status and file the
complaint. Then, in the second step, the court examines the complaint to
determine if it is frivolous under section 1915(d). If frivolous, the action
may then be dismissed. Other circuit courts have either explicitly or im-
plicitly approved this two step procedure, but have not required it.63
59. See Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1969);
Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 316 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920 (1964);
Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 604 (9th Cir.) (Duniway, J., concurring), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 845 (1963).
60. See supra text following note 29.
61. See Petitions to Sue, supra note 10, at 747-53. But see Catz & Guyer, supra note 1,
at 675-79 (argues that courts should have no more power over in forma pauperis plaintiffs
than over paying plaintiffs); cf. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 498-99 (1963) (trial
judge could not refuse a free trial transcript to an indigent criminal appellant even if the
appeal appeared frivolous); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 481-82, 484-85 (1963) (state
court could not refuse defendant appellate review because of requirement that a trial
transcript be fied with the court where only a public defender could obtain transcripts for
indigents).
62. See, e.g., Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1225-26 n.5 (9th Cir. 1984);
Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Dugan v. Lumpkin, 640
F.2d 189, 189-90 (9th Cir. 1979) (Ely, J., dissenting); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948,
950 (4th Cir. 1979); Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1976); Taylor v. Gib-
son, 529 F.2d 709, 714 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1976); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891-92 (5th
Cir. 1976); Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1972).
63. See Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983); Martin-Trigona v.
Stewart, 691 F.2d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 1982); Wiggins v. New Mexico State Supreme Court
Clerk, 664 F.2d 812, 814-15 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 840 (1982); Crisafi v.
Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1306-10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Collins v. Hladky, 603
F.2d 824, 825 (10th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Cline v. Herman, 601 F.2d 374, 375 (8th
Cir. 1979); Van Meter v. Morgan, 518 F.2d 366, 367 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied,
423 U.S. 896 (1975); Duhart v. Carlson, 469 F.2d 471, 473 (10th Cir. 1972), cert denied,
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One circuit has required its district courts to follow a one step proce-
dure: the courts must determine whether a complaint is frivolous before
granting in forma pauperis status. 4 Thus, even if an applicant is finan-
cially eligible, a court can deny in forma pauperis status because of frivo-
lousness and can consequently refuse to file the complaint. This one step
procedure apparently merges sections 1915(a) and 1915(d). Other cir-
cuits have allowed this one step procedure, 65 while two circuits have al-
lowed it but expressed a preference for the two step procedure.66 One
circuit has allowed both the one step and two step procedures without
stating a preference for either.67
Several reasons suggest that the one step procedure should be al-
lowed.68 Most significant, the statutory language, read literally, at least
allows the one step procedure.69 Section 1915(a) states that a court
"may," not "shall," authorize an applicant to proceed in forma pauperis
if he or she is financially eligible.70 Section 1915(a) also requires the ap-
plicant to state the nature of the action, suggesting that the court may
appropriately examine the merits of the action before granting in forma
pauperis status. 1 Finally, section 1915(d) expressly permits a court to
dismiss an in forma pauperis action not only if it finds the action to be
frivolous but also if it finds that the allegation of poverty were untrue.72
This power further suggests that financial eligibility and frivolousness are
intertwined.
Other reasons have also been presented in support of the one step pro-
cedure. Some have argued that the history of in forma pauperis proceed-
ings suggests that one step is proper.73 It has also been reasoned that the
one step procedure protects defendants from the time and expense of re-
410 U.S. 958 (1973); Brown v. Schneckloth, 421 F.2d 1402, 1403 (9th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 847 (1970).
64. See Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Court, 510 F.2d 130, 132-34 (7th
Cir. 1975).
65. See Evans v. Tennessee Dep't of Corrections, 514 F.2d 283, 284 (6th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam) (dictum); Boag v. Boies, 455 F.2d 467, 468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
926 (1972); see also Shobe v. California, 362 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.) (district court has espe-
cially wide latitude under § 1915 to dismiss civil suits brought by prisoners against cor-
rectional authorities), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 887 (1966).
66. See Dughan v. Lumpkin, 640 F.2d 189, 189 (9th Cir. 1979); Forester v. California
Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1975); West v. Procunier, 452 F.2d 645, 646 & n.2
(9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
67. Graham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133, 134-35 (4th Cir. 1977).
68. See Catz & Guyer, supra, note 1, at 672-75; Petitions to Sue, supra note 10, at 755-
57.
69. See, eg., Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1915).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982). See Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Court,
510 F.2d 130, 132 (7th Cir. 1975); Wright v. Rhay, 310 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 373 U.S. 918 (1963); Reece v. Washington, 310 F.2d 139, 140 (9th Cir. 1962).
71. See Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Court, 510 F.2d 130, 132 (7th Cir.
1975).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 132-33; Catz & Guyer, supra note 1, at 673; Petitions to Sue, supra note
10, at 756.
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sponding to frivolous actions.7 4 Moreover, the one step procedure helps
minimize the drain on public funds and judicial resources that in forma
pauperis litigants might otherwise cause.7" Also, it has been noted that a
Supreme Court case from the year 1915 allowed the one step proce-
dure. 6 Finally, some maintain that the one step approach is the only
way to avoid a conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
On the other hand, several reasons support the use of the two step
procedure. This approach assures the creation of an adequate record for
appeal-if an applicant is financially eligible, then in forma pauperis sta-
tus is granted, the complaint is filed, and a docket number is necessarily
assigned." Furthermore, if the complaint is filed under the two step pro-
cedure, then a dismissal for frivolousness can be on the merits, and res
judicata can bar future similar actions." Some also argue that the two
step procedure minimizes wealth discrimination: an indigent person can
file a complaint as easily as a paying plaintiff."° Finally, some judges
have considered and relied on a 1980 report from the Federal Judicial
Center." Based on the statutory language, that report recommended
that courts follow the two step procedure. It reasoned that because sec-
tions 1915(a) and 1915(d) are separate subsections, the focus of section
1915(a)-financial eligibility-and the focus of section 1915(d)-frivo-
lousness-should be considered distinctly; the one step procedure blurs
that distinction. 2
The best resolution of this problem is to allow district courts to use
either the one step or two step procedures, but to recommend the two
step as the preferred method. The two step procedure is the better ap-
proach for three reasons. First, the construction of section 1915-with
74. See Forester v. California Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1975).
75. See McTeague v. Sosnowski, 617 F.2d 1016, 1019 (3d Cir. 1980); Weller v. Dick-
son, 314 F.2d 598, 601 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963); Duniway, supra note
2, at 1281-82. For a discussion of the types of costs entailed by a civil action and the
costs to the federal government of an in forma pauperis action, see Catz & Guyer, supra
note 1, at 659-62; Maguire, supra note 2, at 362.
76. See Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Court, 510 F.2d 130, 133 (7th Cir.
1975) (citing Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U.S. 43, 45 (1915)).
77. The Seventh Circuit expressed concern that the two step procedure would conflict
with its holding in Nichols v. Schubert, 499 F.2d 946, 947 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam),
that Rule 4(a) requires issuance of a summons despite the complaint's frivolousness. See
Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Court, 510 F.2d 130, 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1975).
One author has also noted this problem. See Petitions to Sue, supra note 10, at 756-57
n.95.
78. See Forester v. California Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1975); Duhart v.
Carlson, 469 F.2d 471, 473 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958 (1973); Stiltner v.
Rhay, 322 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 920 (1964).
79. See Campbell v. Beto, 460 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1972).
80. Id.
81. Federal Judicial Center, supra note 11; see Martin-Trigona v. Stewart, 691 F.2d
856, 857 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Dugan v. Lumpkin, 640 F.2d 189, 190 (9th Cir.
1979) (Ely, J., dissenting); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 950 (4th Cir. 1979); Sinwell
v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 18 n.9 (3d Cir. 1976).
82. See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 11, at 57.
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the separate subsections-does at least suggest that financial eligibility
and frivolity should be considered separately.13 Second, although the
one step procedure does not preclude a district court from assigning a
docket number and creating a record for appeal, 4 the two step procedure
guarantees that a court will create a record. 5 Finally, the two step pro-
cedure will enhance finality by causing more decisions to be made on the
merits for res judicata purposes.8 6
Nonetheless, the one and two step procedures should both be permit-
ted. The nebulous statutory language apparently allows for either.8 7
Further, if, as discussed below, the mere filing of an in forma pauperis
complaint does not require the issuance and service of process,88 then
either the one step or the two step method adequately protects defend-
ants and the public from too many frivolous claims. 9 Most important, if
either the one step or two step procedure is not allowed, then there will
be a technical impediment to the rapid resolution of cases. The apparent
purpose of section 1915(d) is to speed the resolution of clearly meritless
claims brought in forma pauperis. 0 Thus, section 1915 should not be
construed to create a procedural stumbling block. This conclusion is re-
inforced by the realization that if the mere filing of an in forma pauperis
complaint does not trigger the issuance and service of process, then the
differences between the one step and two step procedures are minimal
and insignificant.91
83. See supra notes 4, 82 and accompanying text.
84. See Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Court, 510 F.2d 130, 133 (7th Cir.
1975); Petitions to Sue, supra note 10, at 757.
85. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. The doctrine of res judicata can be
used to dispatch repetitive complaints promptly. Some prisoners file so many repetitive
complaints that the courts impose "gag orders" limiting the number of complaints that
may be filed in the future. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231-32 (9th Cir.
1984).
87. See supra notes 4, 69-72 and accompanying text. The legislative history is also
ambiguous. If anything, it suggests that both the one step and two step procedures are
permissible: "The court may dismiss the suit at any time." H.R. Rep. No. 1079, 52d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1892).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 92-114.
89. See Forester v. California Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir. 1975); Dawson
v. Lynch, 423 F.2d 1136, 1136 (9th Cir. 1970).
90. See Dawson v. Lynch, 423 F.2d 1136, 1136 (9th Cir. 1970); H.R. Rep. No. 1079,
52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1892).
91. See Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1976). See supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
A remaining issue is to determine when a dismissal under section 1915(d) is on the
merits. If the court follows the one step procedure, then the complaint is not filed and the
dismissal thus cannot be on the merits. If the court, however, follows the two step proce-
dure, the dismissal should be on the merits because the complaint has been filed and the
court has judged the docketed case. An exception would be if the court relied on
§ 1915(d), but the complaint was actually wholly insubstantial and thus failed to confer
jurisdiction. If the court lacked jurisdiction, it could not dismiss on the merits.
See supra text accompanying note 29.
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III. ISSUANCE OF PROCESS
If a plaintiff pays the district court filing fee, then issuance and service
of process is required unless the complaint is insufficient to confer subject
matter jurisdiction.92 The most obvious basis for this requirement is
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a). Some courts, however, have relied
on more general policy considerations to impose this requirement.93
If a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the district court can dismiss
without issuance of process for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, just
as the court can dismiss the complaint of a paying plaintiff. The difficult
question is whether an in forma pauperis complaint that confers jurisdic-
tion can nonetheless be dismissed as frivolous under section 1915(d)
without issuance of process.
Section 1915(d) does not outline the procedures that the courts should
accord in forma pauperis plaintiffs.9 4 The legislative history is likewise
uninformative.95 Thus, the analysis must focus on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(a). Rule 4(a) states: "Upon the filing of the complaint the
clerk shall forthwith issue a summons and deliver the summons to the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, who shall be responsible for prompt
service of the summons and a copy of the complaint."96 Thus, if a plain-
tiff pays the filing fee and the complaint is filed, then the clerk must im-
mediately issue a summons for service of process. 97
If a district court dismisses an in forma pauperis complaint pursuant
to the one step procedure, then the complaint is never filed and Rule 4(a)
clearly does not require issuance of process.9" Difficulties arise, however,
if the court follows the preferred two step procedure: does the granting
of in forma pauperis status based on financial eligibility and the conse-
quent filing of the complaint trigger immediate issuance and service of
process, even if the complaint is frivolous?
Rule 4(a) read along with Rule 4(c)(2)(B)(i) and section 1915(c) sug-
gests that in forma pauperis plaintiffs may be treated differently from
paying plaintiffs. Rule 4(a) requires the clerk to issue the summons to
the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney, who then arranges for service of
92. See Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981); Howard v. Lem-
mons, 547 F.2d 290, 290 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
93. In Tingler v. Marshall, 716 F.2d 1109 (6th Cir. 1983), the court relied on its
supervisory powers to require service of process. See id. at 1112. In Armstrong v. Rush-
ing, 352 F.2d 836, 837 (9th Cir. 1965), the court suggested that service of process and a
hearing on the merits are the essence of the judicial system.
94. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982).
95. See H.R. Rep. No. 1079, 52d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1892). If anything, the House
Report suggests that Congress was concerned only with providing indigents with access
to the federal courts, and thus did not consider whether in forma pauperis plaintiffs
should have the same procedural rights as those of paying plaintiffs. See id.
96. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a).
97. See Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1340-42 (9th Cir. 1981).
98. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a); see, e.g., Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County
Court, 510 F.2d 130, 132-34 (7th Cir. 1975); Boag v. Boies, 455 F.2d 467, 468 (9th Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 926 (1972).
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process. 99 In forma pauperis plaintiffs, however, are not responsible for
service of process. Rule 4(c)(2)(B)(i) and section 1915(c) provide instead
that officers of the court, such as United States marshals, shall serve the
process."° Thus, Rule 4(a) cannot be complied with literally if the plain-
tiff proceeds in forma pauperis. Consequently, one can reasonably argue
that the Rule 4(a) requirement of immediate issuance and service of pro-
cess does not necessarily apply to in forma pauperis cases-that is, Rule
4(c)(2)(B)(i) and section 1915(c) effectively create an exception to Rule
4(a).101
Considering policy factors would therefore be appropriate. Essen-
tially, the same policy factors that were relevant to the definition of "friv-
olous" are also relevant to deciding whether issuance of process should
be required. 102 Two related factors stand out and weigh in favor of not
requiring issuance of process. In forma pauperis plaintiffs have little to
lose by bringing numerous meritless actions. No economic disincentives
temper their enthusiasm for filing complaints.'013 Further, if issuance,
99. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a).
100. Rule 4(c)(2)(B)(i) provides:
A summons and complaint shall, at the request of the party seeking service or
such party's attorney, be served by a United States marshal or deputy United
States marshal, or by a person specially appointed by the court for that purpose,
only-
(i) on behalf of a party authorized to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to
Title 28, U.S.C. § 1915 ....
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(B)(i).
Section 1915(c) provides: "The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process,
and perform all duties in such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the
same remedies shall be available as are provided for by law in other cases." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) (1982).
Section 1915(c) has not been meaningfully amended since its original enactment as the
Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1982) with Act
of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252.
101. The originally promulgated Rule 4(a) contained the "forthwith" requirement that
the present Rule 4(a) contains. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a), 308 U.S. 664 (1940). Rules 4(a)
and 4(c) were not amended until 1980, and those amendments were irrelevant to the
issues surrounding in forma pauperis actions. See 2 J. Moore, J. Lucas, H. Fink & C.
Thompson, Moore's Federal Practice 4.01[1], [28]-[31] (2d ed. 1984). The Rules were,
however, significantly amended in 1983. The language concerning issuance of the sum-
mons to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney was added to Rule 4(a), and the language
expressly designating in forma pauperis plaintiffs for special attention was added to Rule
4(c). See Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 2, 96 Stat. 2527. The purpose of the
1983 amendments was to relieve the United States marshals of the burden of serving
process in all cases; instead the Rules now designate limited and specific cases, such as in
forma pauperis actions, where the marshals must still accomplish service. See 128 Cong.
Rec. H 9848 (1982) (letter endorsing the amendments from the U.S. Dep't. of Justice,
Office of Legislative Affairs, produced by Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 4434, 4435-36. However the analysis of whether there must be issu-
ance and service of process for in forma pauperis actions might have differed before the
1983 amendments, the current analysis must be governed by the plain language of the
Rules as they now stand.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 30-41.
103. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984). See supra note 10
and accompanying text.
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and hence service, of process is required, then beleaguered defendants,
usually prison officials, must bear the expense and inconvenience of re-
sponding to and defending frivolous claims."
When the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, three policy factors have been
identified as weighing in favor of immediate issuance of process: the
traditional adversary relationship is maintained, inefficiencies in the judi-
cial process are minimized, and the judiciary avoids the appearance of
acting as a proponent instead of as an independent entity."05
When the plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, however, these factors
are largely undermined. First, because most in forma pauperis plaintiffs
are also pro se, a true adversary relationship rarely exists. Inevitably, pro
se plaintiffs are unable to represent themselves adequately against defend-
ants who have attorneys.10
6
Second, allowing district courts to dismiss frivolous in forma pauperis
complaints without issuance of process should impel, not inhibit, judicial
efficiency. Early dismissals will spare judicial resources"°7 as well as ease
the burden on frequently targeted defendants.108 The proper definition of
"frivolous" will prevent inefficient remands due to premature dismissals
of possibly meritorious claims. Currently, the lack of clear guidance to
the district courts for dealing with in forma pauperis complaints presents
a major obstacle to judicial efficiency."°
104. See Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41-43 (2d Cir. 1983).
105. See id. at 41; Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1981).
106. Furthermore, the adversary relationship, for whatever it may be worth in a pro se
action, can exist when an in forma pauperis plaintiff appeals a sua sponte dismissal; a
defendant can participate in the appeal even if there had been no service of process in the
district courL See, eg., Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981); Wil-
liams v. Field, 394 F.2d 329, 330 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 891 (1968); Bauers v.
Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 584 n.2 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1021 (1967). Clearly,
if the in forma pauperis plaintiff has an attorney in the district court proceedings, an
adversary relationship will exist. The presence of an attorney, however, is rare. See infra
note 159.
107. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the purpose of the 1983
Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 was to relieve some of the burden of service of process
from the United States marshals. See 128 Cong. Rec. H 9848 (1982) (letter endorsing the
amendments from the U.S. Dep't. of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs, produced by
Rep. Edwards), reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 4434, 4435-36. Dis-
missing in forma pauperis actions before service of process will further that goal.
108. See Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983); Weller v. Dickson, 314
F.2d 598, 604 (9th Cir. 1983) (Duniway, J., concurring); Federal Judicial Center, supra
note 11, at 59.
109. See, e.g., McRorie v. Sunn, No. 81-4619, slip op. (9th Cir. Nov. 18, 1983) (mem.)
(reversing a § 1915(d) dismissal because the complaint was sufficient to state a claim);
Copeland v. Spalding, No. 81-3309, slip op. (9th Cir. July 26, 1983) (mem.) (reversing a
section 1915(d) dismissal because there had been no service of process); see also Smith v.
Barnhart, No. 82-3154, slip op. (9th Cir. Dec. 27, 1983) (mem.) (afflirming a § 1915(d)
dismissal because the complaint was insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction; the
court did not distinguish between frivolousness and lack of jurisdiction). The Ninth Cir-
cuit attempted to address some in forma pauperis issues in Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d
1221 (9th Cir. 1984). The court held that in forma pauperis actions may be dismissed
before there has been service of process on the defendants. Id. at 1225-26. The court
1985]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Third, clear standards for in forma pauperis cases will undermine the
appearance that the judiciary may be acting as a proponent for the de-
fendant. Moreover, the courts have an interest in conserving sparse judi-
cial resources. Because in forma pauperis plaintiffs lack disincentives for
filing frivolous claims, the courts act appropriately by disposing of frivo-
lous claims as efficiently as is statutorily and constitutionally
permissible. 110
Finally, case law weighs heavily in favor of allowing the dismissal of
frivolous in forma pauperis complaints without issuance of process. Six
circuit courts do not require issuance.'1 ' One circuit court has inconsis-
tent decisions," 2 while only one circuit expressly requires issuance of
process.113
In conclusion, policy factors and case law suggest that even after an in
forma pauperis complaint is filed, if the complaint is frivolous under sec-
tion 1915(d), then immediate issuance and service of process should not
be required. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(a) does not dictate other-
wise.' 14 Thus, if issuance is not required, circuit courts will not be con-
strained to reverse district courts on a mere procedural technicality-the
failure to issue and serve process in a frivolous action.
IV. OPPORTUNITY TO AMEND
In some cases, an in forma pauperis complaint might be frivolous be-
noted the absence of economic deterrents to in forma pauperis plaintiffs from bringing
frivolous lawsuits. Id. at 1226. In addition, the court adopted the Watson v. Ault, 525
F.2d 886, 892 (5th Cir. 1970), definition of frivolous that provides an in forna pauperis
action must have "arguable substance in law and fact." Murphy, 745 F.2d at 1227-28.
110. See supra notes 38, 107 and accompanying text.
111. See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1225-27 (9th Cir. 1984); Collins v.
Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 828 (10th Cir. 1979); Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 950 (4th
Cir. 1979); Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1976); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d
886, 893 (5th Cir. 1976); Forester v. California Adult Auth., 510 F.2d 58, 60 (8th Cir.
1975).
The Ninth Circuit had inconsistent decisions until October 1984 when it decided
Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984). Compare Dodd v. Spokane County,
Washington, 393 F.2d 330, 333 n.3 (9th Cir. 1968) (dictum) (noting that procedural pro-
tections are required) and Armstrong v. Rushing, 352 F.2d 836, 837 (9th Cir. 1965)
(procedural protections required) with Williams v. Field, 394 F.2d 329, 330 (9th Cir.)
(affirming district court decision withholding service), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 891 (1968).
112. The Second Circuit clearly does not require service but has recommended and
disfavored dismissals before service. Compare Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d
Cir. 1983) (favoring dismissal prior to service) with Bayron v. Trudeau, 702 F.2d 43, 45
(2d Cir. 1983) (expressing opposition to dismissal before service) and Moorish Science
Temple of Am., Inc. v. Smith, 693 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1982) (same).
113. See Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Court, 510 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir.
1975); see also Catz & Guyer, supra note 1, at 672-79 (arguing that in forma pauperis
plaintiffs should be treated the same way as paying plaintiffs under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
114. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. But see Wartman v. Branch 7,
Civil Div., County Court, 510 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir. 1975); Petitions to Sue, supra note
10, at 756-57.
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cause it technically fails to state a claim, yet it will present facts sufficient
to notify a district court that an amendment to the complaint could eas-
ily cure the deficiency. For example, a pro se prisoner might clearly pres-
ent a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs,"15 yet the
prisoner might mistakenly denominate the claim as one for equal protec-
tion instead of as one for cruel and unusual punishment. Also, a plaintiff
might clearly set forth a legitimate claim but name the wrong party as
the defendant. Similarly, in other cases, a plaintiff might adequately state
a claim, but nonetheless present only vague and conclusory factual alle-
gations.1 16 A district court could dismiss such an in forma pauperis com-
plaint as factually frivolous,1 17 but an amendment to the complaint,
merely adding additional facts, might easily cure the deficiencies." 8
Consequently, before dismissing at least some in forma pauperis com-
plaints, a district court should notify the plaintiff of the deficiencies in the
complaint and should afford the plaintiff an opportunity to cure those
deficiencies by amending the complaint.1 9 These procedural protections
should be required as a matter of policy pursuant to the supervisory pow-
ers of the circuit courts. 120
The difficult problem is to determine when these procedural protec-
tions should be required. Two solutions are possible. One would require
the district courts to give an opportunity to amend the complaint in all
cases except when an amendment could not cure the deficiency.' 2M The
other possibility would be to require the district court to allow amend-
ment only when an amendment could clearly save the complaint. " The
former possibility would create a presumption that an amendment
should be allowed, while the latter would create a presumption that an
amendment should not be allowed.
The better method is to presume that an amendment should be al-
115. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1976).
116. See, eg., Keniston v. Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir. 1983).
117. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
118. As previously stated, many in forma pauperis litigants appear pro se. Complaints
by such plaintiffs should be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972) (per curiam); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1346 n.11 (9th Cir. 1981).
119. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980); Broughton v. Cutter Lab-
oratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980); Potter v. McCall, 433 F.2d 1087, 1088 (9th
Cir. 1970); Armstrong v. Rushing, 352 F.2d 836, 837 (9th Cir. 1965).
Furthermore, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) grants a plaintiff a right to amend until either the
defendant files a responsive pleading or the district court dismisses the action. See Wood
v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705 F.2d 1515, 1520 (9th Cir. 1983), cerL
denied, 465 U.S. 1081 (1984); Worldwide Church of God, Inc. v. California, 623 F.2d
613, 616 (9th Cir. 1980). If the dismissal precedes the defendant's answer, the plaintiff
retains his right of amendment. Wood, 705 F.2d at 1520.
120. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
121. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984); Gillespie v. Civi-
letti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980); Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458,
460 (9th Cir. 1980).
122. The Supreme Court has noted that district courts need not allow amendments
that would be futile. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
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lowed: a district court should allow an opportunity to amend unless an
amendment could not cure the deficiencies of the complaint. This
method has one major advantage. Most in forma pauperis plaintiffs pro-
ceed pro se and are typically inexperienced and unskilled in pleading.123
Though they might have legitimate claims, many pro se plaintiffs present
their complaints so ineptly that they obscure the legitimacy of their
claims. 24 Thus, if the district courts are required to notify these plain-
tiffs of the deficiencies in their complaints and to allow them an opportu-
nity to amend, those plaintiffs with legitimate claims will be more likely
to proceed successfully."2
Of course, this more liberal approach has disadvantages. Plaintiffs
with clearly meritless claims will have an additional opportunity to evade
early dismissal through artful pleading. Moreover, requiring amend-
ments in more cases will probably increase the workload of the district
courts; whenever a plaintiff in a frivolous case files an amended com-
plaint, a district court will have to spend time reviewing that amended
complaint. 126
However, these disadvantages may be offset. District courts will likely
allow an amendment as a matter of course because allowing an opportu-
nity to amend will be the rule rather than the exception under the ap-
proach urged in this Article. 127 Having a district court initially allow an
opportunity to amend is more efficient than having the district court dis-
miss the complaint without amendment, the circuit court reverse to al-
low an amendment, and then the district court allow an amendment on
remand. Further, few pro se litigants will be capable of disguising frivo-
lous claims through artful pleading. Thus, a district court should notify
a plaintiff of the deficiencies in a complaint and afford an opportunity to
amend unless an amendment could not cure the deficiencies. 128
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Concluding that section 1915 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allow the courts to treat in forma pauperis plaintiffs differently from pay-
123. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. Prisoners can get aid from other
prisoners, but these "writ writers" are frequently not too helpful. See Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969); id. at 498-500 (White, J., dissenting).
124. See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 11, at 3, 11-12.
125. This requirement is also consistent with the requirement that courts construe pro
se complaints liberally. See supra note 118.
126. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
127. Thus, the courts would be complying with the spirit of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). See
supra note 119.
128. The District of Columbia and Tenth Circuits have recommended that district
courts issue statements of reasons whenever they dismiss frivolous complaints. See
Crisai v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825,
828 (10th Cir. 1979). These statements of reasons would expedite appellate review.
Often, if a district court has issued an order that notifies the plaintiff of a complaint's
deficiencies to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, that order could also serve as
a statement of reasons if the case were eventually appealed.
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ing plaintiffs raises constitutional issues in three areas: substantive due
process, equal protection and procedural due process. Examination of
these areas reveals, however, that the recommended construction of sec-
tion 1915 does not entail any constitutional violation under current con-
stitutional standards.
The Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right of meaningful
access to the courts for prisoners in civil rights cases. 29 Although the
Court has discussed this right only in cases involving prisoners, all civil
rights litigants should be afforded this same right; the right of meaningful
access for prisoners is not based on their confinement, but on the funda-
mental rights at stake.13  Other in forma pauperis litigants-those not
protecting their civil rights-might have no constitutional right of access
to the courts.131
The touchstone of this recognized fundamental right is that court ac-
cess be "meaningful."' 132 Recognition of this limited fundamental right
facilitates resolution of the constitutional questions raised above.
A. Substantive Due Process
The fundamental right of meaningful access is a substantive due pro-
cess right. 133 District courts do not deny this right either by denying in
129. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-23, 828 (1977); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539, 577-80 (1974); see also Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (recognizing
the "fundamental importance of the writ of habeas corpus in our constitutional scheme").
130. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974).
131. The Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right of meaningful access for
civil actions in only one case other than the cases involving prisoners. Compare Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) ("due process does prohibit a State from denying,
solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial
dissolution of their marriages") with Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973) (no
recognition of right to access; welfare benefits have less constitutional significance than
marriage and thus no fundamental interest is gained or lost depending on court access)
and United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973) (no right of court access because
eliminating one's debts through bankruptcy proceeding does not rise to the same consti-
tutional level as marriage and divorce). The evisceration of Boddie by Kras and Ortwein
has been extensively discussed and criticized. See, e.g., Houseman, Equal Protection and
the Poor, 30 Rutgers L. Rev. 887, 889-91 (1977) (cases indicate that the rights involved
must be of "high priority" in order for litigant to be assured access to court); Michelman,
The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees" The Right to Protect One's Rights--Part
1, 1973 Duke L.J. 1153, 1162-63 (Supreme Court should have recognized a general con-
stitutional right of judicial access instead of focusing on what is at stake in a particular
litigation).
132. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1977).
133. "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law .. " U.S. Const. amend. V.
The Supreme Court, though calling the right of access a due process right, see Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974), has not expressly identified it as either a proce-
dural or substantive right. Two reasons indicate that it is a substantive due process right.
First, the Court calls it a "fundamental" right. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828
(1977). Second, in both Bounds and Wolf, state prisoners were complaining about their
treatment in prison. Procedural due process is not triggered unless a person is deprived
of "life, liberty, or property." See infra text accompanying note 149. Thus, if any gov-
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forma pauperis status based on frivolousness (one step procedure) 134 or
by granting in forma pauperis status, filing the complaint and then dis-
missing the action without service of process (two step procedure)., 31
The key to this analysis is the significance of "meaningfulness" in the
fundamental right.136 By allowing indigent prisoners to lodge their com-
plaints and applications for in forma pauperis status, Congress has
clearly provided some access to the courts. Furthermore, cases reason-
ably based in law and fact are allowed to proceed further. Only "frivo-
lous" complaints are not allowed to proceed. Thus, this access is
meaningful: allowing a frivolous complaint to proceed further before dis-
missal would not significantly or "meaningfully" increase the access of
indigents to the courts.
Underlying this analysis is a fair definition of "frivolous."'1 37 For ex-
ample, if courts were able to resolve disputed issues of fact when testing
for frivolousness, then the access would not be meaningful. In addition,
affording the opportunity to amend the complaint suggests that only
claims that are actually frivolous will be dismissed. 13  Thus, an indigent
prisoner can present a claim to the courts. If it might be meritorious, the
case continues; if it is frivolous, the case ends. The fundamental right of
meaningful access requires nothing more.139
B. Equal Protection
Equal protection has two strands: fundamental rights and suspect clas-
sifications. If a legislative classification interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or if the legislation is based on a suspect classification,
then the courts must test the legislation with strict scrutiny.' 40 To pass
the strict scrutiny test, a law must be necessary to promote a compelling
ernment owed the prisoners procedural due process, it would have been the government
that had allegedly denied them their civil rights by mistreating them. Thus, any proce-
dural due process claims of the prisoners would have to have been directed at the state
governments. Therefore, the fundamental right of access to the federal courts must be a
substantive due process right.
134. See supra text accompanying note 64.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
136. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 48-59.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 115-28.
139. The analysis has focused on the concept of "meaningfulness" as a limiting factor
in the definition of the fundamental right of access to the courts. Usually, however, the
concept of "meaningfulness" is used as an expanding factor. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (prison authorities must assist inmates in the preparation and
filing of legal papers by providing adequate law libraries or assistance from trained peo-
ple). Nonetheless, the trend of Supreme Court decisions strongly suggests that the Court
also views "meaningful" as a limiting factor. See supra note 131, infra notes 153-58 and
accompanying text.
140. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
470-71 (1977); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1971).
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governmental interest.1 41  If strict scrutiny is not required, then the
courts apply a rational basis test under which the law must be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.14 2 In the special cases of
discrimination based on gender or a child's legitimacy, the courts apply
an intermediate test under which the law must be substantially related to
the achievement of an important governmental objective.1 43
Treating in forma pauperis plaintiffs differently from paying plaintiffs
does not violate equal protection. As discussed above, this differential
treatment does not violate the fundamental right of meaningful access to
the courts."4 Further, indigency is not a suspect classification, and it
obviously does not involve discrimination based on gender or legiti-
macy.'45 Thus, the rational basis test must be applied and it is easily
satisfied. The different treatment of indigent in forma pauperis plaintiffs
is rationally related to several legitimate governmental interests. Al-
lowing courts to dismiss in forma pauperis complaints without service of
process saves money for the government, 14" avoids conflicts between the
federal judiciary and state prison authorities,147 and eases congestion of
the federal courts."' Thus, equal protection is not violated.
C. Procedural Due Process
The constitutional requirement of procedural due process is not trig-
gered unless a person is deprived of "life, liberty, or property." '49 Be-
cause the present Supreme Court has narrowed the meaning of "life,
liberty, or property" to only those rights created by the states or enumer-
ated in the Constitution,"5 ' the only right that could possibly be deprived
in this situation is the fundamental right of meaningful access to the
courts.15' But as discussed above, the different treatment of in forma
141. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
471 (1977); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
142. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
143. This test has been applied to laws which discriminate on the basis of gender, see
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1977), and on the basis of a child's legitimacy, see
Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8 (1983) (quoting Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99
(1982)).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 133-39.
145. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); San Antonio Indep. School Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
146. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 9-11, 36 and accompanying text.
149. U.S. Const. amend. V; id. amend. XIV; see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-
24 (1976). See supra note 133.
150. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-29 (1976); L. Tribe, supra note I, §§ 10-
10 to -11; Glennon, Constitutional Liberty and Property: Federal Common Law and Sec-
tion 1983, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 355, 359-63 (1978); Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and 'Prop-
erty," 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 429-34, 442-43 (1977). Justice Stevens criticized the
majority in Meachum for unduly limiting the concept of liberty and recommended a
natural law approach. See Meachum, 427 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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pauperis prisoners does not interfere with this fundamental right.152
Therefore, no procedural due process rights are triggered.
D. Explanation
The simple resolution of the three constitutional issues is disturbing-
indeed, the issues were almost trivial. This result is not due to happen-
stance. In cases involving unequal treatment, the Supreme Court has
focused on a fundamental rights approach, not a suspect classification
approach. Had the Court recognized indigency as a suspect classifica-
tion, different treatment of in forma pauperis plaintiffs would probably
violate equal protection, and the problem of how to define a fundamental
right of access to the courts would be bypassed.15, 3 But because indi-
gency is not recognized as a suspect classification,15 4 the search for equal-
ity focuses on the identification of fundamental rights, whether under
equal protection or substantive due process.'55
The present Supreme Court, however, does not adhere to an egalita-
rian approach in its definition of fundamental rights-the Court is will-
ing to grant minimal protection, not equal protection, to indigents.' 5
6
Therefore, the Court has defined the fundamental right of access nar-
rowly, focusing on the "meaningfulness" of the access and has refused to
recognize a fundamental right of equal treatment in the courts, even in
criminal cases.' 57 Consequently, the three constitutional issues were eas-
ily resolved.' 58
CONCLUSION
The federal in forma pauperis statute allows indigent persons to pro-
ceed in the federal courts, yet further provides that courts can dismiss
"frivolous" actions. A "frivolous" action lacks reasonable basis in law or
fact. A district court may follow either a one step or two step procedure
when processing an in forma pauperis complaint. Under the one step
procedure, the court considers both financial eligibility and the frivolous-
152. See supra text accompanying notes 133-39.
153. See generally Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972) (discussing the
evolution of equal protection analysis from the Warren Court to the Burger Court).
154. See supra note 145.
155. See generally Ely, Foreward: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 Harv. L.
Rev. 5 (1978) (discussing the possible sources of fundamental rights).
156. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1980); San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973). Professor Tribe has extensively developed and
discussed this concept in his treatise on constitutional law. L. Tribe, supra note 1, §§ 16-
33, -50, -56 to -57. For a discussion of the transition from the Warren Court to the
Burger Court and the consequent problem of the intertwining of suspect classifications
and fundamental rights, see Porter, Rodriguez, The "Poor" and the Burger Court: A Pru-
dent Prognosis, 29 Baylor L. Rev. 199, 210-14 (1977).
157. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-16 (1974); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353, 356-57 (1963).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 129-52.
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ness of the complaint before granting in forma pauperis status and filing
the complaint. Under the preferred two step procedure, a court grants in
forma pauperis status based solely on financial eligibility. The court con-
siders the frivolousness of the complaint only after it grants in forma
pauperis status and files the complaint. Further, a court can sua sponte
dismiss a frivolous complaint without issuing and serving process on the
defendant. Before dismissal, however, the court should notify the plain-
tiff of the deficiencies of the complaint and should allow the plaintiff to
amend the complaint, unless its deficiencies cannot be cured.
By following these suggestions, district courts will lessen the burden
caused by the enormous number of frivolous in forma pauperis com-
plaints. Yet, the courts will be forced to examine the complaints suffi-
ciently to assure that meritorious claims will not be prematurely
dismissed. Any further solution of the in forma pauperis problem must
be legislative. The recognition that many of the policy factors discussed
in this Article are especially relevant to prisoners suggests a possible leg-
islative approach: the enactment of two in forma pauperis statutes--one
for prisoners and one for all other indigent plaintiffs. The prisoners stat-
ute could grant the district courts the discretion necessary to maintain
control over the burgeoning prisoner civil rights caseload of the federal
courts. The other statute could grant other indigent plaintiffs the same
procedural rights as paying plaintiffs. Ideally, Congress should provide
for mandatory appointed counsel for any in forma pauperis plaintiff-
whether a prisoner or not-whose complaint is not frivolous. 5 9 Thus,
an indigent plaintiff would actually have a reasonable chance for success
on the merits of a meritorious claim. Moreover, any appearance of judi-
cial impropriety would be undermined. The initial screening of frivolous
complaints would not appear merely as a means for district courts to
sweep the poor from their dockets. Rather, the screening would be a
means of identifying those complaints worthy of further serious consider-
ation. Only then would the federal courts be truly open to the poor.
159. This solution has been suggested by others. See Duniway, supra note 2, at 1284-
87; Turner, supra note 8, at 652. Section 1915(d) already provides for the discretionary
appointment of counsel, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982), but this power is rarely used. Cf.
United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Motions for appointment
of counsel under section 1915 are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and
are granted only in exceptional circumstances."), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 958 (1982).
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